The Jay Bruce Trade Keeps Giving

Typically, speaking when fans are frustrated during the offseason it would indicate their team has been largely inactive.  After a “flurry” of early activity that included Neil Walker accepting the qualifying offer and Yoenis Cespedes signing a four year deal that team has been the Mets.

The frustrating reason why the Mets have been inactive is they have been unable to move Jay Bruce or even Curtis Granderson this offseason.

When the Cubs traded away Jorge Soler before signing Koji Uehara, I was almost led to believe that a team could not sign a free agent reliever until they traded away an outfielder.  Given the relative inactivity on all free agents this offseason, it seemed like this was a bizarre and strange wrinkle added to the newly ratified Collective Bargaining Agreement.  Alas, when the Marlins signed Junichi Tazawa and Brad Ziegler it proved a team can sign a reliever without trading an outfielder.

That’s what makes this offseason so frustrating.  The Mets are letting Bruce and/or Granderson hold their entire offseason hostage while players who can very well help them are going to other teams.  Once again, the Mets have signaled they are not quite willing to spend.  They are not willing to spend like a team in New York.  They are not willing to spend like a team on the cusp of the World Series.  Instead, this team is actually looking to cut payroll from its current levels before making another move.

Somewhere, someone is saying that spending doesn’t guarantee a World Series.  That person is largely correct.  However, this point also neglects the Chicago Cubs, a team that just went to the NLCS, went out last offseason and signed Ben Zobrist, Jason Heyward, and Jon Lester.  The team also took on Aroldis Chapman‘s salary because they needed a closer heading into the offseason.  No, the money didn’t guarantee the Cubs the World Series, but the money spent helped them win the World Series.  By the way, Zobrist was the World Series MVP.

Somewhere else is a fan urging patience.  Admittedly, Chapman and Kenley Jansen making late decisions held up most of the free agent market.  This in turn led to a late and slow developing market for the next tier of relievers.  However, those relievers are now coming off the board, and the Mets were not really in the discussion for any of them.  In reality, the Mets aren’t going to be contenders for any relievers if they are looking to hand out cheap one year deals.

This means a player like Fernando Salas, who was very good for the Mets last year, may very well find himself playing for another team without receiving a competitive offer from the Mets.  That really is unacceptable.

Lastly, there is someone saying that signing a reliever now would really hurt Bruce’s trade market.  This is of course nonsense because Bruce obliterated much of the trade market by hitting .219/.294/.391 with the Mets.  That market took another hit when the Mets re-signed Cespedes.  It took yet another hit when Sandy said the Mets had to trade him before making another deal.  Essentially, the Mets have forfeited whatever little leverage they had in trade discussions.  How can the team re-signing Salas hurt Bruce’s market any more than it has?

Overall, the fact is the Mets are going to eventually be able to move Bruce.  Once players like Jose Bautista, Edwin Encarnacion, and even Mark Trumbo sign, there are going to be teams interested in Bruce.  However, how long is that going to take in what has been a really slow developing free agent market on almost all fronts?  What players that can help the Mets are still going to be available in free agency?

The likelihood is players that would be willing to sign with the Mets are going to be elsewhere which makes this inactivity all the more frustrating.  The team has real needs in the bullpen, and they need to address them now especially with the prospect of losing Jeurys Familia for 30 games.

Ultimately, it is time the Mets act like an even mid-sized market team and get the players it needs to compete for a World Series next season.  This isn’t a matter of going out there and giving Jerry Blevins a five year deal for the sake of making a move.  It is a matter of letting a pitcher like Ziegler go to an in-division rival on a reasonable contract.  That’s an error created by the Mets not having the resources they need to compete.

It’s a shame too because with one or two moves this team could have been drastically better.

Mets Veteran Starting Options

Matt Harvey, Jacob deGrom, and Steven Matz are coming off season ending surgeries, and the Mets most likely don’t want them making over 30 starts and/or going over 200 innings.  The Mets need someone to fill-in for those starts and eat up some innings.

Additionally, the team needs a fifth starter.  If the season was going to begin today, the fifth starter would be determined by a competition between Seth Lugo and Robert Gsellman.  Both pitchers showed enough to prove they deserve the job out of Spring Training.  However, both pitchers are likely going to be on innings limits, which would prevent them from pitching the entire 2017 season unless the team skips a couple of their starts.  That reverts back to the issue created by Harvey, deGrom, and Matz that the Mets need another arm to eat up some innings.

Naturally, the hope is that Zack Wheeler could be the fifth starter at some point during the season.  However, after missing two straight seasons due to Tommy John surgery, the Mets would be hard pressed to rely upon him to provide anything during the 2017 season.  It is a large reason why the Mets have at least discussed the possibility of putting Wheeler in the bullpen to start the season.

Pitchers like Sean Gilmartin and Gabriel Ynoa did not show the Mets enough in 2016 to prove they can be relied upon to make more than one or two spot starts.  With that, it is likely the Mets are going to need to look outside the organization for a pitcher who is willing to start the year as a fifth starter, but is willing to transition to the bullpen as the year progresses.  Ultimately, the Mets are looking for someone to reprise the role that Bartolo Colon was slated to serve during the 2016 season.  With that in mind, here are some available free agent pitchers who could serve in that role:

Rubby De La Rosa

2016 Stats: 4-5, 4.26 ERA, 13 G, 10 GS, 50.2 IP, 1.243 WHIP, 9.6 K/9

While Welington Castillo got most of the publicity, De La Rosa was another surprise non-tender by the Arizona Diamondbacks. The reason De La Rosa was non-tendered was because there remains a real possibility he needs a second Tommy John surgery. At the moment, he has been trying to use stem cell treatment as a means to circumvent the surgery. For what it is worth, Bartolo Colon used the stem cell therapy back in 2010, and he was able to revive his major league career.

When he is healthy, De La Rosa has a live arm with him throwing a mid to high 90s fastball with a curve and slider who has shown some flashes of dominance. De La Rosa does have issues walking batters in his career, but it should be noted he was pitching to the aforementioned Castillo who is a terrible pitch framer.

Assuming the stem cell therapy will work, and further assuming De La Rosa is ready by Opening Day, the 27 year old needs a team who will help him harness his stuff and a catching staff that will help him get those borderline pitches.  With that in mind, there are few places that are better fits for De La Rosa than the Mets.  At a minimum, the Mets can offer the young pitcher at least a chance to pitch in the rotation while also assuring him a spot in the bullpen where he could become a lights out reliever.

Scott Feldman

2016 Stats: 7-4, 3.97 ERA, 40 G, 5 GS, 77.0 IP, 1.377 WHIP, 6.5 K/9

While Feldman has spent the majority of his career as a league average starting pitcher, the Astros moved Feldman into the bullpen in the 2016 season, and Feldman pitched well for the team in that role.  What is interesting about Feldman’s success was he didn’t throw any differently out of the bullpen than he did as a starter.  The main reason is that in his career as a starter, batters tend to hit Feldman much harder the third time through the lineup.

Overall, Feldman’s numbers would have been much better had he not struggled in his 14 appearances for the Blue Jays.  In those 14 appearances, he pitched to an 8.40 ERA and a 1.933 WHIP.  It might have just been a slump or a poor mix with the Blue Jays because Feldman has not wilted under pressure in his career.  In nine postseason relief appearances, Feldman is 1-0 with a 3.29 ERA, 1.024 WHIP, and a 7.2 K/9.

Given Feldman’s ability to pitch as a league average starter, and his being even more effective out of the bullpen, Feldman could very well be the exact pitcher the Mets need in 2017.

Edwin Jackson

2016 Stats: 5-7, 5.89 ERA, 21 G, 13 GS, 84.0 IP, 1.583 WHIP, 6.5 K/9

For nearly 14 years, there have been 11 franchises that have taken on the mantle of being the franchise that is going to be able to figure out Jackson and help him unlock his potential.  With a career losing record and a 4.65 ERA, none have been successful, and now the 32 year old is a free agent.

There is no doubt Jackson has talent.  He is a five pitch pitcher that predominantly relies upon a low to mid 90s fastball and a slider.  Through his tenure as the Mets pitching coach Dan Warthen has been successful in helping pitchers like Jackson.  Like many of the other pitchers on this list, Jackson should be aided by the Mets pitch framing.  The combination of Warthen and the pitch framing has been shown to help a number of pitchers who have come to the Mets the past few seasons.

Over the last two seasons, Jackson has also begun pitching out of the bullpen.  In 2015, he showed some promise in the role making 47 appearances while going 4-3 with a 3.07 ERA and a 1.168 WHIP.  He would limit batters to a .218/.291/.332 batting line.  Unfortunately, he regressed as a reliever in 2016 after he had failed again as a starter.  Overall, as is the story with most of Jackson’s career, there is promise here, and a union with the Mets could be mutually beneficial.

Kris Medlen

2016 Stats: 1-3, 7.77 ERA, 6 G, 6 GS,  2.055 WHIP, 6.7 K/9

Medlen has gone from a promising young pitcher with the Atlanta Braves to a pitcher whose career is a crossroads with him being limited during the 2016 season with shoulder issues.  While these shoulder issues did not require surgery, they limited Medlen in 2016, and it had an impact on his performance.  Another issue with Medlen is his having two Tommy John surgeries.

With that said, when Medlen is right, he is a good pitcher.  His last year with the Braves, before he needed a second Tommy John surgery, he was 15-12 with a 3.11 ERA, 1.223 WHIP, and a 7.2 K/9.  In 2015, his first year back from his second Tommy John surgery, Medlen was 6-2 with a 4.01 ERA, 1.269 WHIP, and a 6.2 K/9 between eight starts and seven relief appearances.  In the 2015 postseason, he made two appearances pitching six innings with a 3.00 ERA, 0.667 WHIP, and a 12.0 K/9.

If the medicals check out, Medlen can be a very effective pitcher for someone.  Considering the need to get a pitcher comfortable in the rotation and the bullpen, the Mets might be a good fit.

Jon Niese

2016 Stats: 8-7, 5.50 ERA, 29 G, 20 GS, 121.0 IP, 1.587 WHIP, 6.5 K/9

Admittedly, no Mets fan wants to see Niese in a Mets uniform again, especially after a disastrous 2016 season for Niese.  However, it should be noted that Niese was dealing with a knee issue that required season ending surgery.  It should also be noted Niese has been a league average pitcher under Warthen’s tutledge.

In his six seasons as a starter for the Mets, Niese was 59-59 with a 3.86 ERA, 1.351 WHIP, and a 7.0 K/9.  We also saw him come out of the bullpen and get some big outs in the 2015 postseason.  Looking at the pitchers who are likely going to get incentivized one year deals or minor league deals with invitations to Spring Training, you can do a lot worse than Niese.

There is certainly any number of places the Mets could go this offseason.  There are pitchers like Matt Harrison who are injury risks, but who can also be dominant pitchers when healthy.  There are also reclamation projects like Jered Weaver and Tim Lincecum.  Overall, there are many different ways to go.  At this point, the Mets just need to identify their guy, be patient, and let the market develop.  Once it does, the Mets could obtain a pitcher who could very well be a difference maker during the 2017 season.

Players Who Are Just Short of the Hall of Fame

In year two of Hall of Fame voting, I was more forgiving, and I found room to vote for players like Fred McGriff and Vladimir Guerrero when I would not have voted for them last year.  Even with my finding more reasons to vote for different players, there were still some players who just fell short.  Here is a quick synopsis on each:

Jorge Posada, C

Stats: 17 seasons, .273/.374/.474, 1,664 H, 379 2B, 10 3B, 275 HR, 1,065 RBI, 20 SB

Advanced: 42.7 WAR, 32.7 WAR7, 37.7 JAWS

Awards: 5X Silver Slugger, 5X All Star

When you are an important member of the Yankees famed Core Four that won five World Series, you are going to get a long look for the Hall of Fame even if you won only four rings with the group.

While Posada had a good career, it is hard to make a Hall of Fame case for him.  With the average catcher having a 52.7 WAR, 34.2 WAR7, and a 43.4 JAWS, Posada doesn’t quite measure up.  Posada was a good hitter, but was rarely a great hitter averaging just 19 homers and 74 RBI in the 14 seasons he was a regular player.  Behind the plate, he was slightly below average throwing out base runners, but his pitching staff did seem to tout his ability to catch a game.

While he does get some extra credit for all the World Series titles, Posada was rarely great in the postseason.  In 29 series, Posada only had two series you would consider great.  While he doesn’t get penalized for largely uninspired postseason play, he also doesn’t get extra credit for it.

Ultimately, Posada was a good to very good player for most of his career.  Unfortunately, he didn’t compile big counting stats, nor was he an advanced statistic darling.  With that, he falls just short.

Jason Varitek, C

Stats: 15 seasons, .256/.341/.435, 1,307 H, 306 2B, 14 3B, 193 HR, 757 RBI, 25 SB

Advanced: 24.3 WAR, 18.7 WAR7, 21.5 JAWS

Awards: Gold Glove, Silver Slugger, 3X All Star

When you get down to it, the best case for Varitek was he was a member of that 2004 Red Sox team that broke the Curse of the Bambino.  Another factor was he was widely regarded as a leader on that team.  However, it is really difficult to make a case for a player to be inducted into the Hall of Fame based upon intangibles when he falls so short with the traditional and advanced statistics.

Billy Wagner, RP

Stats: 16 seasons, 47-40, 2.31 ERA, 422 SV, 0.998 WHIP, 11.9 K/9

Advanced: 28.1 WAR, 19.9 WAR7, 24.0 JAWS

Awards: 7X All Star

While there are relief pitchers and closers in the Hall of Fame, we have yet to see the person who spent their career as a modern closer enter the Hall of Fame.  For the most part, the closers in the Hall of Fame were multiple inning fireman (Rich Gossage) or pitchers who split time between starting and relieving (Dennis Eckersley).

Looking up and down the list of the closers that have been inducted, it is hard to make a case that any of them were as dominant as Wagner was.  He was a guy that came into the game with a high 90s fastball and struck out the side.  It’s why his ERA+ is higher than any reliever in or eligible for the Hall of Fame.  He amassed 422 saves which is sixth all-time and second among left-handed relievers.  No matter how you analyze it, Wagner was a truly dominant and great closer.

But he’s still short of being a Hall of Famer.  The average closer in the Hall of Fame right now has a 40.6 WAR, 28.2 WAR7, and a 34.4 JAWS.  Wagner falls short of those numbers.  Keep in mind once Mariano Rivera is inducted into the Hall of Fame, those numbers are going to go higher.  Wagner is a classic case where you could overlook the numbers if there was some postseason dominance.  Unfortunately, Wagner was not a good postseason pitcher with him pitching to a 10.03 ERA and a 1.971 WHIP in 14 postseason games.

If you were building a Hall of Fame for closers and other specialists, Wagner is on the first ballot.  However, for the Baseball Hall of Fame, he is unfortunately just short.

Trevor Hoffman, RP

Stats: 18 seasons, 61-75, 2.87 ERA, 601 SV, 1.058 WHIP, 9.4 K/9

Advanced: 28.4 WAR, 19.6 WAR7, 24.0 JAWS

Awards: 7X All Star

Basically, Wagner and Hoffman have the same Hall of Fame resume.  However, there are two stark differences.  In his career, Hoffman saved over 600 games, and at one point was the all-time saves leader.  Despite the save totals, Hoffman was nowhere near as good a pitcher as Wagner was.  Certainly, if Wagner is not a Hall of Famer, Hoffman isn’t either.

 

Why I Didn’t Vote for Ivan Rodriguez

In my opinion, the players that used steroids do not belong in the Hall of Fame.  That is why when I have submitted my IBWAA ballots I have not voted for Mark McGwire, Barry Bonds, Roger Clemens, or anyone else that has been confirmed to have used steroids.  It is a reason why I did not vote for Manny Ramirez this year.

Where things become tricky is when a player has nothing but mere accusations against them.  In reality, it is unfair to use one person’s innuendo or unfounded claims to prevent players like Mike Piazza or Jeff Bagwell from being inducted into the Hall of Fame.  For all we know, these players did it the right way, and with that, they deserved to be treated as such.  For their part, both players have steadfastly stated they did not use steroids, and in reality, no one has presented any evidence to disprove their statements.

Now, based upon my thoughts on Piazza or Bagwell, it can be reasonably argued I should have voted for Ivan Rodriguez.  I didn’t because there was enough there for me to withhold my vote.

The first time we really heard that Pudge was a steroids user was when Jose Canseco published Juiced.  Juiced was more than a tell-all autobiography.  The book also served as Canseco’s opportunity to name players he knew used steroids.  At the time, it seemed like retribution against everyone for Canseco’s own belief that he was blackballed from baseball.  In the book, Canseco named the following players as known or suspected PED users:

  1. Bret Boone
  2. Barry Bonds
  3. Sammy Sosa
  4. Mark McGwire
  5. Rafael Palmeiro
  6. Juan Gonzalez
  7. Jason Giambi
  8. Wilson Alvarez
  9. Ozzie Canseco
  10. Dave Martinez
  11. Tony Saunders
  12. Miguel Tejada
  13. Magglio Ordonez

As we know Palmeiro, Clemens, and Gonzalez were named in the Mitchell Report.  Bonds usage was discovered in conjunction with BALCO.  Tejada and Sosa tested positive for PEDs.  Ozzie Canseco has been charged with steroids possession.  McGwire and Giambi have since admitted to using steroids during his career.

We do not have any confirmation with respect to Boone, Alvarez, Martinez, and Saunders.  Not surprisingly, each of these players have denied using steroids.

The first thing to note with respect to the players Canseco accused of using steroids, he has largely been proven right.  With respect to those players there is no outside confirmation of steroids usage, it is important to note, they all denied using steroids.  It should also be noted Pudge denied using steroids when implicated by Canseco.

However, when he had his next chance to do so, he didn’t.

Back in 2003, Major League Baseball had anonymous survey steroid testing.  The goal of the testing was to see if baseball truly needed a steroids testing policy.  As we all know the results of the testing proved there was a steroids problem in baseball.  Now, the results of that test were supposed to be anonymous, but many people were implicated as a result.

There were players like David Ortiz and Alex Rodriguez whose named were eventually leaked to the press.  Then there were players like Pudge who everyone automatically just assumed tested positive.

For many, Pudge’s sudden weight loss between the 2004 and 2005 seasons was indication he had been using steroids before testing was implemented, and now with testing in place, he was no longer going to use steroids.  That in and of itself is not sufficient to prove he was a steroids user.  Frankly, if that was all that was there, he should be elected into the Hall of Fame.  However, there is one issue associated with the testing and his weight loss that gives you pause.

Pudge was actually asked if he was one of the players who had tested positive during the survey testing.  His response?  It was far from reassuring with him saying, “Only God knows.”  (St. Louis News).

When there was more there than just rumor and innuendo from people like Canseco, Pudge went from denying using steroids use to acting obtuse on the subject.  If Pudge had denied being on the list, I would have voted for him.  However, Pudge chose not to deny it.  He chose to deny it despite there being a number of different reasons to lead a reasonable person to believe he did use steroids during his career.

Ultimately, I denied Pudge my vote because he wouldn’t deny that he could’ve tested positive for steroids.

Changing My Mind on Fred McGriff

Overall, I have decided to vote for Vladimir Guerrero, Jeff Kent, Mike Mussina, Curt Schilling, and Larry Walker on my IBWAA ballot.  If they were up for IBWAA vote, I would have also voted for Tim Raines and Jeff Bagwell while not voting for Edgar Martinez.  In looking at Kent, Mussina, and Walker, I went back over their careers, and I re-assessed whether or not I should vote for them.  Ultimately, I did.  I did the same with players I did not vote for, and as a result, I added one to my ballot:

Fred McGriff, 1B

Stats: 19 seasons, .284/.377/.509, 2,490 H, 441 2B, 24 3B, 493 HR, 1,550 RBI, 38 SB

Advanced: 52.4 WAR, 35.8 WAR7, 44.1 JAWS

Awards: 3X Silver Slugger, 5X All Star

During Hall of Fame voting, many times you will hear about a player being a compiler.  There are two ways you can define compiler: (1) someone who put up a number of counting stats over a very good but not great long career; or (2) Fred McGriff.

Arguably, McGriff was never a truly great player.  In fact, from a WAR perspective, he only had three seasons that you would rate him at superstar or MVP level.    If you take out the partial seasons he played in his first and last year, McGriff averaged a 3.1 WAR.  Basically, this means for most of McGriff’s career, he was a very good, but not quite All Star caliber player.  In that sense, his five All Star appearances seem right on the money.

Like Guerrero.  McGriff’s advanced statistics were held down by his perceived poor base running and defense.  Certainly, McGriff was no Keith Hernandez out there.  In fact, despite his appearance on the Tom Emanski videos, McGriff was not a particularly good first baseman.  Certainly, his .992 fielding percentage was nothing special as far as first baseman go.  It goes a long way in explaining why McGriff had a -18.1 dWAR in his career.  With that said, I am not sure how reliable that -18.1 figure is.

One of McGriff’s contemporaries at first base was the man who replaced him at first base in Toronto – John Olerud.  In Olerud’s playing days, he was considered a very good first baseman who won four Gold Gloves, and in reality, probably should have won more.  That notion has been reinforced by some advanced metrics.  For his career, Olerud’s dWAR was -2.

When reputation and advanced metrics agree a players is a good defensive player at his position, and dWAR completely disagrees, it gives you pause as to whether the calculation is entirely correct.  Assuming McGriff was only half as bad as dWAR suggested, his career WAR would increase to 61.5, which would leave him only 4.4 WAR short of what the average Hall of Famer was.  In fact, you could conclude McGriff was a poor first baseman that merited a negative dWAR and still have him reach the average WAR for a first baseman.

Despite all this hand wringing, the fact remains McGriff probably falls short of being a Hall of Famer due to his defense, and yes, defense matters.  With that said, there are two other factors which give McGriff the benefit of the doubt.

First, McGriff was a money player that was typically at his best when there was a lot at stake.  Using the baseline of his .284/.377/.509 career slash line, here are McGriff’s stats in big situations:

  • RISP: .277/.403/.479
  • RISP, two outs: .241/.399/.421
  • High Leverage: .290/.385/.500

Typically speaking, McGriff was at a minimum slightly better in pressure situations.

Another example of how good McGriff was in pressure situations was the 1993 season.  At the time the Braves acquired McGriff, the Braves trailed the San Francisco Giants by nine games in the National League West Standings.  Over the final 68 games of the season, McGriff would hit an astounding .310/.392/.612 with 19 homers and 55 RBI.  Essentially, McGriff was Yoenis Cespedes before Cespedes was Cespedes.  The Braves needed each and every single one of those homers as they finished one game ahead of the Giants in the standings.

Granted, that was just one season.  However, McGriff’s clutch hitting was also evident in the postseason.  In 50 postseason games, McGriff was a .303/.385/.532 hitter with 10 homers and 37 RBI.  His clutch postseason hitting helped the Braves win their only World Series with the vaunted Greg MadduxTom GlavineJohn Smoltz rotation.  In the 1995 postseason, McGriff hit .333/.415/.649 with four homers and nine RBI.

Overall, his postseason play combined with the question marks surrounding the defensive statistics that push his WAR outside Hall of Fame averages is enough for him to get my vote even if it is my the narrowest or margins.

There is one other small factor at play.  Anyone who saw McGriff towards the end of his career knew he was sticking around to try to get to 500 homers.  At the time, 500 homers was a golden benchmark which led to almost automatic Hall of Fame induction.  Well, McGriff didn’t get there as he fell seven home runs short.  He fell seven home runs short because he began his career in a de facto platoon with Cecil Fielder.  He fell seven home runs short because of the 1994 strike.   He fell seven home runs short because there were pitchers juicing while he wasn’t.  He fell seven home runs short because he was washed up at age 40.  Ultimately, he fell seven home runs short because he just wasn’t good enough to get those seven home runs.

Do you know where he would rank on the all-time home run list with those seven extra home runs?  11th.  Do you know where he currently stands on the list?  11th.  Ultimately, seven home runs over the course of a 19 year career is about one-third of a home run per season.  One-third of a home run per season doesn’t amount to much.  If that is the case, seven home runs should not be the line of demarcation between him being a Hall of Famer and him not garnering much support.

With or without the seven home runs, you can justify voting for McGriff who had a good career for almost all of his 19 seasons.  He has certainly done enough to justify being inducted into Cooperstown.

 

Trivia Friday – Mets in the World Baseball Classic

Countries have begun trying to assemble their rosters for the World Baseball Classic, and it should come as no surprise that many countries are interested in the Mets players.  So far, Ty Kelly (Israel), Seth Lugo (Puerto Rico), and Asdrubal Cabrera (Venezuela) are confirmed to be participating in the World Baseball Classic.  There is also a chance Jeurys Familia (Dominican Republic), Brandon Nimmo (Italy), and Michael Conforto (Italy) could be participating as well.

Whoever plays, they would join a long list of Mets who have played in the World Baseball Classic since its inception in 2006.  Can you name all the Mets players who have played in the World Baseball Classic?  Good luck!


Dae-Sung Koo, Willie Collazo, Pedro Feliciano, Ivan Maldonado, Juan Padilla, Orlando Roman, Jose Santiago, Carlos Delgado, Javier Valentin, Carlos Beltran, Jose Reyes, Jorge Sosa, Duaner Sanchez, Jorge Julio, Victor Zambrano, Tony Armas, Endy Chavez, Stefan Welch, Elmer Dessens, Oliver Perez, Shawn Bowman, Jason Bay, Frank Catalanotto, J.J. Putz, David Wright, Fernando Tatis, Ruben Tejada, Nelson Figueroa, Alex Cora, Jesus Feliciano, Francisco Pena

IBWAA Hall of Fame Vote – Vladimir Guerrero

There are a number of interesting candidates to the Hall of Fame ballot this year.  They are interesting for a multitude of reasons.  There are a group of players who are still tainted by steroids.  There are players who were important members of teams that won multiple World Series titles.  There were also some players who were among the best at their position.  Despite all of that, I am only voting for

Vladimir Guerrero

Stats: 16 seasons, .318/.379/.553, 477 2B, 46 3B, 449 HR, 1,496 RBI, 181 SB

Advanced: 59.3 WAR, 41.1 WAR7, 50.2 JAWS

Awards: 8X Silver Slugger, 9X All Star, 2004 AL MVP

What is interesting about Guerrero is there is a chasm here.  The chasm is the player I perceived Guerrero to be during his playing career, and the player advanced statistics did not like as much as I did.

Looking at the advanced statistics, Guerrero falls short of induction.  The average right fielder has amassed a 73.2 WAR, 43.0 WAR7, and a 58.1 JAWS.  Realistically speaking, Guerrero only comes close in terms of WAR7, and he is still short on that front.  It is also interesting that Larry Walker has cleared each of those thresholds, and yet, he has been trouble gaining traction in Hall of Fame voting.

Another startling fact was Guerrero is actually behind Bobby Abreu, who I do not perceive as a Hall of Famer, in all of those advanced stats.  Ultimately, if Guerrero would be inducted into the Hall of Fame, he would be one of the worst right fielders ever inducted into the Hall of Fame.  Despite the advanced stats, I voted for him anyway.

In his career, Guerrero was as exciting a player as you would see step onto the baseball field.  Not only would he literally swing at anything, he could also hit anything:

He also had one of the strongest arms you will ever see on a baseball field:

Guerrero was why you come to the ballpark, but admittedly, that isn’t enough to deserve enshrinement in Cooperstown.  There has to be a better reason, and there is.

With Guerrero’s 449 homers, he would be the only right fielder with over 400 homers not inducted into the Hall of Fame not named Jose Canseco.  Of all right fielders, he ranks sixth all-time in slugging percentage.  Of the five ahead of him, the only ones not elected in the Hall of Fame are Walker (still eligible), and Juan Gonzalez (steroids).  With 972 extra base hits, he would be the first right fielder with over 950 extra base hits, that has been Hall of Fame eligible and not tainted by steroids, that is not inducted in the Hall of Fame.  To demonstrate how feared a hitter he was, Guerrero ranks fifth all-time in intentional walks, with him leading the league in intentional walks on five different occasions.

On top of this, Guerrero has a good .312 batting average and a respectable .379 on base percentage.  Looking at those numbers, it begs the question over why Guerrero’s advanced statistics are so low.

Well, the first reason is base running.  Guerrero was not the most successful of base stealers only being successful 65.8% of the time.  For example, in the year he reached a career high 40 stolen bases in his quest to reach 40/40, he was caught stealing a league leading 20 times.  Overall, Guerrero has been asserted to be among the worst base runners of all time.  In fact, it has been said he is the worst non-catcher base runner of all time.

Between that and advanced statistics, pre-StatCast, not loving his defense, Guerrero went from a hitter certainly worth of enshrinement to a player that advanced statistics indicate should be on the outside looking in.  Guerrero has lost 10.7 in WAR due to his defense and an additional three due to his base running.  Between the two, that is 13.7 lost in WAR.  If you were to add that back, Guerrero’s career WAR would be 73, which is right on the cusp for enshrinement.

This isn’t to say defense and base running don’t matter.  It also isn’t to say the WAR calculations are definitively wrong.  Rather, it does leave room for the concept that maybe the data would be calculated differently, especially in the StatCast era, that would be beneficial to Guerrero.  It also leaves room for the idea that much of the issues with base running and defense were associated with him spending much of his career playing for Felipe Alou and Mike Scioscia, two managers who demanded an aggressive, some would say reckless, base running style.  They are also two managers not well know for their adherence to advanced data, which could have helped with Guerrero’s defense.

Again, this is just leaving room, and it is not making excuses for the areas in the game where Guerrero has been alleged to have been lacking.

Overall, Guerrero, a former MVP, was one of the best players in baseball during his playing career, and he was certainly a player that outshone his peers.  Ultimately, he deserves induction to Cooperstown.

Hall of Fame Ballot – Players Inducted by the IBWAA

If you were to look at the IBWAA ballot, voters are unable to vote for three players which are on the BBWAA ballot.  The reason is those players already garnered the necessary 75% to be considered Hall of Famers according to the IBWAA.  While I cannot vote for those players like I did for these other four players, I do think it is worthwhile to examine their candidacy especially when they are eligible for Hall of Fame induction.

Tim Raines, LF

Stats: 23 seasons, .294/.385/.425, 430 2B, 113 3B, 170 HR, 980 RBI, 808 SB

Advanced: 69.1 WAR, 42.2 WAR7, 55.6 JAWS

Awards: Silver Slugger, 7X All-Star

Over the span of 23 years, Raines had three different careers.  From 1981 – 1987, Raines was the best leadoff hitter in the National League, and perhaps the second greatest leadoff hitter of all time.  The problem was during this time frame Raines was overshadowed by his contemporary, Rickey Henderson, who is widely regarded as the best leadoff hitter of all time.  Another fact to consider was Raines has been overlooked due to his great years being in Montreal.

From 1988 – 1995, Raines was a solid regular who was still an on base machine.  He was still stealing bases, but not at an elite clip like he was earlier in this career.  He was a good player you wanted on your team, but he was no longer an All-Star caliber player; certainly not in an era when players were starting to hit for more and more power.

From 1996 – 2002, Raines was a player holding on.  First, he was looking to get that ring as a veteran leader for a Yankees team about to start its next dynasty.  Next, he was holding on so he could play with his son Tim Raines, Jr. with the Baltimore Orioles.

We can all agree that if Raines career spanned from 1988 – 2002, he would not be a Hall of Famer.  In that time frame, he really only had one truly great year in 1992.  Other than that, he was a solid player to veteran leader.  However, Raines career started much each than that.  In reality, his career as an everyday player started in 1981.

From 1981 – 1987, Raines was as good as anyone in baseball.  In that seven year stretch, his average season was .310/.396/.448 with 103 runs, 31 doubles, nine triples, nine home runs, 55 RBI, and 72 stolen bases.  He would accumulate 38.4 WAR while averaging 5.5 WAR per season.  For the sake of comparison, Henderson’s best stretch was arguably from 1982 – 1988.  In those seasons, Rickey averaged .289/.399/.447 with 26 doubles, four triples, 16 home runs, 56 RBI, and 86 stolen bases with a 6.7 WAR.  Looking at these numbers, we can all agree that Rickey was the better player, but was he that much better during this stretch?

Again, remember that Rickey was not a borderline Hall of Famer.  He was a no doubter.  Rickey being slightly better than you means you were still a Hall of Fame talent.  That is evidenced by Raines having a higher WAR, WAR7, and JAWS than the average Hall of Fame left fielder.  Even if you note, Rickey played at a Hall of Fame level much longer than Raines, it does not mean Raines was not a Hall of Famer.  It means Raines was the second best leadoff hitter of all time.  That deserves induction.

If you are not convinced, here are some other interesting facts.  Raines is fifth all-time in stolen bases, and if he was inducted, he would have the best stolen base percentage of anyone inducted into the Hall of Fame.  Raines’ 85% success rate is the best in major league baseball history out of anyone with over 312 stolen bases.  He is the only player to steal 70 bases in seven consecutive seasons.  With that said, you could argue that while he doesn’t have the highest numbers, no one was better at successfully stealing a base than Raines.

Overall, the case is just too strong.  Raines is a Hall of Famer, and he should be inducted in his final year of eligibility.

Jeff Bagwell, 1B

Stats: 15 seasons, .297/.408/.540, 448 2B, 32 3B, 449 HR, 1,529 RBI, 202 SB

Advanced: 79.6 WAR, 48.2 JAWS7, 63.9 JAWS

Awards: Gold Glove, 3X Silver Slugger, 4X All Star, 1991 Rookie of the Year, 1994 NL MVP

Part of me understands Bagwell not having gained induction into the Hall of Fame.  As someone who closely followed baseball during Bagwell’s playing time, he didn’t seem like one of the best players in baseball let alone someone who would be a Hall of Famer.  However, when you look at the numbers, and his career, it is hard to make a case against him.

From 1991 – 2004, Bagwell was an everyday player who averaged 32 homers and 108 RBI with an outstanding 150 OPS+.  To put it in perspective, Willie McCovey, a good example of a slugging first baseman, averaged 32 homers and 88 RBI with a 161 OPS+  during the best 11 year stretch of his career.  McCovey is an interesting comparison as he had to hit in Candlestick, which like the Astrodome, was a difficult place to hit homers.  The difference between the two is McCovey played at a time when it was more difficult to hit homers, and McCovey reached that formerly magic 500 home run threshold.  Still, if Bagwell’s career numbers are comparable to the best of McCovey, certainly Bagwell is a Hall of Famer.

However, Bagwell was more than a slugging first baseman.  He was a threat on the bases.  His 202 stolen bases ranks him 20th among first baseman.  Notably, however, none of the 19 ahead of him hit more than 106 homers in their careers.  Bagwell’s speed was an interesting dynamic for a first baseman who could also hit 30+ homers in a season.  An interesting factoid from Bagwell’s career is that Bagwell actually led the league in scoring on three different occasions.  It is all the more remarkable when you consider he spent most of his career hitting in the middle of the lineup.

Moreover, Bagwell has the advanced statistics to garner induction.  His WAR is sixth all-time at the position.  That puts him ahead of such renown Hall of Famers like the aforementioned McCovey, Harmon Killebrew, and Hank Greenberg.  Overall, the only thing that can be used to justify keeping Bagwell out of the Hall of Fame is steroids.  However, there is no proof or statement Bagwell used steroids.  Absent that, keeping him out of the Hall of Fame is wrong, and therefore, he should be inducted to Cooperstown.

Edgar Martinez, DH

Stats: 18 seasons, .312/.418/.515, 514 2B, 15 3B, 309 HR, 1,261 RBI, 49 SB

Advanced: 68.3 WAR, 43.6 WAR7, 56.0 JAWS

Awards: 5X Silver Slugger, 7X All Star

Let’s start with one common fallacy we are seeing with people who are making cases for Martinez to be inducted into the Hall of Fame.  Many will argue Martinez deserves induction because he has a higher batting average than Jackie Robinson, a higher on base percentage than Stan Musial, a higher slugging than Ernie Banks, more doubles than Babe Ruth, more homers than Rogers Hornsby, more RBI than Tony Gwynn, more hits than Joe DiMaggio, and a higher WAR than Yogi Berra.  This is a distraction because Edgar Martinez was not a position player like the aforementioned players.  Edgar was a DH.

That is not to suggest a DH can’t be inducted into the Hall of Fame.  In fact, there are already two that have been inducted.  The first was Paul Molitor in 2004, and the second was Frank Thomas in 2014.  With there being two DHs already in the Hall of Fame, we have a baseline upon which to judge Martinez’s candidacy.  When judging Martinez up against Molitor and Thomas, he falls short.

Thomas accumulated the following advanced stats: 71.0 WAR, 45.2 WAR7, and a 59.5 JAWS.  He also had 500 homers.  Molitor accumulated a 75.4 WAR, 39.6 WAR7, and a 57.5 JAWS.  He also had 3,000 hits, and he was the 1993 World Series MVP.

Looking at Martinez, he falls behind Thomas and Molitor in terms of career WAR and JAWS.  Basically, the only argument Martinez would have based upon the advanced statistics is WAR7.  However, it is hard to justify enshrinement based upon that one statistic, especially when you consider Martinez didn’t have as long a career, and he didn’t have the magic numbers like Thomas and Molitor.

If you want to expand the numbers, you could start building a better case.  You could argue Martinez’s 147 OPS+ and 147 wRC+ was far above Molitor’s 122 OPS+ and 122 wRC+.  However, Martinez’s numbers fall well short of Thomas, who put up a 156 OPS+ and a 154 wRC+.

This is important when you consider one of the justifications provided for Martinez’s enshrinement is the supposition that he was the best DH of all-time.  However, looking over all of the numbers, he wasn’t.  The best DH of all-time was Frank Thomas.

It is hard to say he deserves enshrinement as being somewhere between 2-5 on the all-time list of DH.  First, the DH position has only be around since 1973, and for many years Harold Baines was considered the best DH.  No one was arguing Baines’ case for induction into the Hall of Fame when he was elected.

The other fallacy argument is DH should be treated as closers, which is another specialty position.  It is true that closers are a specialty position, but relievers have been around since there has been baseball.  The first professional team was founded in 1869, and Major League Baseball was founded in 1903.  Since that time, there have been exactly five relief pitchers inducted into the Hall of Fame.  The main reason is the position is seen as a specialist position.  Therefore, only the best of the absolute best should be inducted.

Keep in mind, when Lee Smith was first eligible to be inducted he was the all-time saves leader, and he had a 132 OPS+, which was much higher than pitchers who had already been inducted into the Hall of Fame.  For example, Tom Seaver, a pitcher who is arguably the best right handed pitcher of all time, had a 127 ERA+.  Smith never garnered more than 50.6% of the vote because while he was arguably a great specialist, he did not do enough as a specialist to earn Hall of Fame enshirnement.

That is where I am with Edgar.  He was a very good DH, and he was one of the best ever.  However, he was not the best DH, nor did he do anything as a DH better than anyone in history.  He was just really good at a specialty role.  That makes him an all-time Mariner.  That makes him an all-time DH.  It does not equate to being a Hall of Famer.

IBWAA Hall of Fame Vote – Players From Last Year’s Ballot

With the induction of Mike Piazza and Ken Griffey, Jr. coupled with Alan Trammell having fallen off the ballot, some of the glut that has been there in year’s past is no longer there.  Still, there are a number of people on the ballot who are deserving of Hall of Fame induction.

Before addressing who I did and who I did not vote for, it should be noted that I am not one who believes steroids users should be inducted into the Hall of Fame.  However, I do believe there needs to be some evidence of usage if you are going to deny someone of a vote.  For far too long Piazza was denied induction despite the complete lack of credible evidence against him.  This fate has also befallen Jeff Bagwell.  And no, my opinion on this did not change with the induction of Bud Selig.  One mistake should not beget another.

For example, Jesse Haines is considered one of the worst selections in major league history.  However, he is not used as a door to induct any starter with a 200 wins and an ERA above 3.50.  If that was the case, David Cone and Dwight Gooden would be kicking themselves over retiring before getting those last six wins.

That is why I typically compare players to the average Hall of Famer at that position.  Saying someone is similar to the worst player inducted only serves to reduce the quality of the players inducted.  To compare everyone to the best of the best excludes players who had truly remarkable careers.  With that said, I compare players to the average with some caveats.  First, you should get extra credit for postseason play.  Second, you should get extra credit for doing something better than anyone has at that position.  Third, winning hardware and awards do matter.  Note, I only treat those as bonuses and not detractors.

With that long preamble, here are the players I voted for in last year’s IBWAA balloting.  After re-examining the respective cases, I am once again voting for the following players:

Larry Walker

Career Stats: 17 seasons, .313/.400/.565, 471 2B, 62 3B, 383 HR, 1,311 RBI, 230 SB

Advanced: 72.6 WAR, 44.6 WAR7, 58.6 JAWS

Awards: 7X Gold Glove, 3X Silver Slugger, 5X All-Star, 1997 NL MVP

While Mark McGwire was generally seen as the test for whether steroids players would be inducted into the Hall of Fame, Walker has been the test case for players that have put up terrific offensive numbers at Coors Field.  So far, Walker has been penalized for playing in Coors Field, and many people have disregarded someone who has been one of the best right fielders to every play the game.

In his heyday, Walker was not only an outstanding hitter, he was an outstanding fielder as evidenced by his Gold Gloves.  He was  one of the most complete players of his generation.  Despite that, he is being discounted due to Coors Field where players put up proverbial video game numbers.

Yes, Walker did benefit from playing in Coors Field.  In his career, Walker was a .381/.462/.710 hitter.  However, it should be noted that on the road for his career, Walker was a 278/.370/.495 hitter.  Furthermore, in his six years with the Expos at the beginning of his career, he hit .281/.357/.483.  Reggie Jackson, who was a first ballot inductee, was a career .262/.356/.490 hitter.  Walker’s road and Expos numbers compare very favorably to Jackson.

With the Jackson comparison, the MVP Award, the Gold Gloves, and the advanced stats, Walker should be inducted into Cooperstown.

Jeff Kent

Stats: 17 seasons, .290/.356/.500, 560 2B, 47 3B, 377 HR, 1,518 RBI, 94 SB

Advanced: 55.2 WAR, 35.6 WAR7, 45.4 JAWS

Awards: 4X Silver Slugger, 5X All Star, 2000 NL MVP

There are many good reasons not to vote for Kent.  He was a corner infielder masquerading as a second baseman.  The advanced stats certainly don’t match up to the standard for induction into the Hall of Fame.  All of this is very true, but I voted for him anyway.

The reason is Kent is the best slugging second baseman in major league history, and he’s the best hitter at the position next to Rogers HornsbyAmong second baseman, he’s hit the most home runs, fourth most doubles, third highest RBI, and the second highest slugging percentage. When you add the 2000 MVP to the picture, there is enough there to say Kent deserves induction into Cooperstown.

Curt Schilling

Stats: 20 seasons, 216-146, 3.46 ERA, 83 CG, 22 SHO, 22 SV, 1.137 WHIP, 3,116 K

Advanced: 79.9 WAR, 49.0 WAR7, 64.5 JAWS

Awards: 6X All-Star, 1993 NLCS MVP, 2001 WS MVP

Many could look upon Schilling’s career, and they could lament over a relatively low win total and high ERA.  However, that is only the tip of the iceberg when it comes to Schilling.

Looking at Schilling’s advanced numbers, he certainly has done enough to earn induction into the Hall of Fame.  His WAR and JAWS are above the average for Hall of Fame pitchers.  His 127 ERA+ is the same as Tom Seaver‘s.  In terms of more traditional stats, Schilling is in the Top 15 on the career strike out list.  He is also has the second best K/BB ratio among players eligible for the Hall of Fame.  These numbers alone should warrant induction.

On top of that, Schilling is the definition of a Big Game Pitcher.  In his postseason career, Schilling was 11-2 with a 2.23 ERA and a 0.968 WHIP.  In the World Series, Schilling was 4-1 with a 2.06 ERA and a 0.896 WHIP.  He has won an NLCS MVP and a World Series MVP.  He was a key member of three World Series winning clubs.  Between his postseason heroics and his regular season dominance, Schilling is a Hall of Famer.

Overall, if we are being honest, the reason Schilling won’t be inducted this year or the upcoming years will be a result of his post-career actions.

Mike Mussina

Stats: 18 seasons, 270-153, 3.68 ERA, 57 CG, 23 SHO, 1.192 WHIP, 2,813 K

Advanced: 83.0 WAR, 44.5 WAR7, 63.8 JAWS

Awards: 6X Gold Glove, 5X All-Star

At age 39, Mussina finally got to the elusive benchmark of 20 wins in a season.  Judging from that year, it appeared he had an extra couple of years left in him to go make a run at 300 like many in his shoes would have.  Certainly, with his conditioning and the like, he had at least three years left in him to get it, and if he had, he likely would have been elected into the Hall of Fame without much of a fight.

However, Mussina did not get to that magical number leaving us to examine what was an interesting and a very good career.

To appropriately view Mussina, it needs to be within the context of his era.  Mussina not only played during the Steroids Era, but he also pitched in a bandbox like Camden Yards for the majority of his career.  It is a huge reason why that despite his relatively high 3.68 ERA for Hall of Fame standards, Mussina has a career 123 ERA+.  His 123 ERA+ is the same as Juan Marichal who pitched in a different era, had a career 2.89 ERA, and was a inducted his fourth time on the ballot.

Mussian’s ERA+ is also much higher to first ballot Hall of Famer Nolan Ryan and his 112 ERA+.  What is interesting about that is despite being completely different pitchers with very different careers, Mussina and Ryan have similar cases from an advanced stat point of view.  Despite having pitched in nine more seasons than Mussina, Ryan actually trails Mussina in career WAR.  Ryan also trails Mussina in WAR7 and JAWS.

This is not to diminish Ryan’s career.  He was a first ballot Hall of Famer for a reason.  He was a 300 game winner with more strikeouts and no-hitters than anyone in baseball history.  Despite these tremendous stats, it is arguable that Mussina was a the superior pitcher to Ryan.  When you can create a valid argument why someone was a better pitcher than a no-doubt Hall of Famer like Ryan, you belong in the Hall of Fame; and ultimately, that is why Mussina belongs in Cooperstown.

Bud Selig Does Not Belong in the Hall of Fame

The Veteran’s Committee, which has been re-branded as the Today’s Game Era Committee, somehow elected former commissioner Bud Selig into the Baseball Hall of Fame.  With that, Selig becomes one of the worst choices for the Hall of Fame in baseball history.

Sure, his proponents will point to his achievements.  Under Selig, we got the Wild Card and Interleague play, which arguably helped baseball achieve higher ratings and revenues.  Furthermore, Selig was in charge when MLB Advanced Media (MLB AM) was established.  The establishment of the internet media company was visionary and has provided a huge boost to MLB.  Under Selig’s stewardship, we have seen labor peace for the first time and incrementally improving steroid testing.  These are all achievements to be sure, but they overshadow what has been a largely negative tenure in baseball for Selig.

1980’s Collusion

Selig first became an owner in 1970 when he purchased the Seattle Pilots, and he moved them to Milwaukee after the Pilots inaugural season.  Selig was then one of the owners who colluded in the 1980s to suppress players salary and movement between teams.  At this time, future Hall of Famers like Carlton Fisk, Phil Niekro, and Andre Dawson were having a difficult time just getting a free agent offer.  This was a pattern that continued throughout the decade, and eventually, it led to union filing grievances against the owners.  Eventually, this led to owners having to agree to a $280 million settlement to the MLBPA.

It has been alleged Selig was one of the leaders of the owner’s collusion to improperly restrict player movement and to suppress player salaries.  It just so happens that a small market team like the Brewers were beneficiaries of the policy with the team being able to hold onto future Hall of Famers Paul Molitor and Robin Yount for much longer than they probably would have had the system not been improperly rigged.  This collusion set the stage for the disastrous 1994 player strike.

Ascension to Power

As Commissioner, Fay Vincent would make two “mistakes” that would lead to the end of his tenure.  The first was he treated players like an equal part in the business of baseball.  The second was he chastised the owners for collusion saying, “The single biggest reality you guys have to face up to is collusion. You stole $280 million from the players, and the players are unified to a man around that issue, because you got caught and many of you are still involved.”  (metsmerizedonline.com).

This along with many other reasons designed to help his franchise, the Milwaukee Brewers, was a catalyst for Selig organizing the owners to remove Vincent from power.  Ultimately, the owners made an 18-9 no confidence vote, and a humiliated Vincent would resign from his office.  This led to Selig’s rise to power.

Cancellation of the 1994 World Series

One of the singular owners responsible for collusion and the deep distrust between the players and owners was now in charge of baseball.  With his newfound power, he wanted to usher in a complete change in economics and relationship with the players.  In effect, he wanted to normalize the collusion practices of the 1980s by trying to impose a hard cap on the players.  He and the owners tried this despite having full knowledge this was a non-starter for a union the owners never broke in negotiations.

The method Selig sought to try to break the union was to wrongfully withhold a payment to the players’ pension and benefits plan.  This singular action was the proverbial straw that broke the camel’s back, and it all but forced the union to set a strike date.  After the strike was in effect, and after mediation proved ineffective, Selig, as acting commissioner, set forth a deadline of September 9th.  If there was no deal in place, the baseball season would be over.

On September 8th, the players set forth a deal with some concessions.  However it should be noted those concessions fell far short of all the demands of the owners, including but not limited to a salary cap.  The owners never presented a counter-offer.  Rather, on September 14th, the World Series was officially cancelled despite there presumably being sufficient time left on the calendar to get a deal done and have a postseason.

Unfair Labor Practices

With the strike dragging on and there being no hopes of new Collective Bargaining Agreement, the owners, led by their acting commissioner, Selig, enacted the salary cap they wanted in the first place.  Undaunted, the owners announced a plan to go forward with the 1995 season using replacement players if the major league players on strike could not capitulate to the new labor rules the owners were trying to force upon them.  Like with owner’s collusion attempts, this would have near disastrous consequences.

First, the issue of the owners colluding once again went before an arbitrator.  The arbitrator found in favor of the players to the tune of $10 million.  Next, Congress nearly revoked baseball’s anti-trust exemption.  Lastly, the owners were found to have committed unfair labor practices.  As a result, future Supreme Court Justice Sonia Sotomayor issued an injunction against the owner’s improper salary cap, and ordered that the players could return to work under the guise of the recently expired collective bargaining agreement.

In effect, the owner’s action, under the guidance of Acting Commissioner Bud Selig, led to the loss of the World Series and $10 million dollars.  Moreover, it led to fan anger, and it deeply hurt some franchises.  For all of that, the owners accomplished nothing.

Death of Baseball in Montreal and Municipally Funded Ballparks

At the time of the strike, the Expos were the best team in baseball with a 74-40 record.  It looked like the beginning of a promising run for the Expos because not only did they have the lowest payroll in the majors, they had some exciting young stars in Cliff Floyd, Moises Alou, Larry Walker, Pedro Martinez, and John Wetteland.  For a Canadian franchise that just saw its fellow Canadian franchise, the Toronto Blue Jays, win back-to-back World Series, it appeared as if it was finally the Expos turn.

It would never happen.

After the costly strike, the Expos were forced to trade away almost all of its players.  As the Expos owners at the time put it, they could not afford to keep the team together, especially without the revenues that could’ve been generated by a long postseason run.  Between the anger with the strike and with the Expos getting rid of all their best players, there simply was no reason for fans to come to the ballpark anymore.  Ultimately, the Expos attendance figures would continuously decline until they actually drew under one million people in 1998.

The declining attendance figures helped Selig come up with his next ploy that would not only help the Brewers, but would also anger fans in other cities – contraction.  In the 2001 offseason, the owners voted to have the ability to contract as many as two major league franchises.  The teams cited for contraction were the Tampa Bay Devil Rays, Florida Marlins, Montreal Expos, and Minnesota Twins.  Effectively, this created a game of musical chairs and the ability to help coerce cities to fund ballparks.

First, the Marlins owners were part of a group of owners that purchased the Boston Red Sox.  With the Marlins needing ownership, the Jeffrey Loria, a man who had claimed almost full ownership of the Expos, was then approved as the purchaser of the Florida Marlins.  With an ownership void, baseball took the unprecedented act of purchasing the Expos.

It should be noted smaller market clubs like the Pirates and the Brewers were not among those mentioned in contraction talks despite their claims of their operating in the red.  The main reason is those cities had already agreed to build those teams a new ballpark.  Eventually, the cities of Minneapolis and Miami would agree to financially support owners to build a new ballpark.  With the hopes of building a new ballpark in Montreal dashed, baseball eventually moved the Expos to Washington, D.C. who had agreed to take on the funding of a new ballpark for the team.

Between the strike and contraction threats, Selig helped kill baseball in Montreal.  He did it as part of his mission to get municipalities to fund and build ballparks for teams.  Overall, he has been largely successful on that front, but there are still issues in Tampa (lease) and Oakland.

As an aside, it should be noted that the Expos were one of the few teams to lose a superstar during the collusion practices of the 1980s.  Basically, the practices Selig either led or helped promote had an enduring effect of harming baseball in Montreal.

The Oakland Athletics Limbo

O.co Coliseum is largely seen as an antiquated ballpark.  Moreover, it is widely assumed the Athletics need to build a new ballpark to help create new revenue streams in order to be able to compete financially.  Many assume the Athletics need to move out of Oakland in order to get the type of ballpark and market needed to compete.  On both fronts, the Athletics found a willing partner with the City of San Jose.

There is just on problem – the San Francisco Giants have the rights to that city.  Under somewhat antiquated rules, the San Francisco Giants have the rights to San Jose meaning only the Giants have the right to move there.  This decision was in place despite the cities of San Francisco and Oakland being part of the larger metropolitan area known as the Bay Area.  Notably, San Jose is also part of that area.

To put things in perspective, the distance between the two ballparks is 15.3 miles.  Citi Field and Yankee Stadium are similarly apart in that the two ballparks are 9.7 miles apart.  Similar to Oakland and San Francisco, you need either use public transportation or cross a bridge to get to the other ballpark.  Keeping those distances in mind, the Giants having control over San Jose would be like the Yankees having control over Northern New Jersey, thereby preventing the Mets from building a ballpark in the Meadowlands next to Metropolitan Stadium even though the team is moving within the same metropolitan area.

Note, this could never happen because the Mets and Yankees do not have separate territorial rights.  Yet, somehow the Giants and Athletics do, and with baseball’s anti-trust exemption, the Athletics franchise has been in limbo.

Despite the limbo, the declining revenues, and attendance, Selig refused to help address the issue despite San Jose’s pleas.  Selig had an opportunity to show leadership, and help all of the major league franchises.  Instead, he demurred while bemoaning how the Athletics current situation is irreconcilable.  With Selig’s retirement, he has left the mess for the new commissioner, Bob Manfred.

The Steroids Era

To say baseball didn’t benefit from the Steroids Era would be a lie.  Back in 1998, Mark McGwire and Sammy Sosa were chasing down Roger Maris‘ single season home run record, and fans angered at the strike were coming back to the game.  At the time, Selig would say, “This is a renaissance.”  (Howard Bryant, ESPN.com).

However, to hear Selig tell it now, he tried to get to the bottom of what was happening.  As he recently told Jayson Stark of ESPN.com, “They gave me a whole bunch of reasons.  And I kept asking about steroids.”  Selig would go on to say in the interview, “You know, I’ve thought about it a hundred times, because I’m pretty tough on myself.  And I honestly don’t know what else I could have done. That’s my answer.”

Now, to be fair to Selig, as the commissioner, he could not unilaterally impose sanctions on players who used steroids.  Additionally, he could not impose testing.  It should also be noted Selig did have broad discretion to do this with the minor leagues, and he did in fact do it.  To that end, he does deserve some credit.

With that said, it is noticeable Selig did not use his pulpit as commissioner to try to impose steroids testing or suspensions.  As seen above, when it came to the financial aspect of baseball, Selig tried to obtain unprecedented power.  In the wake of the costly collusion lawsuit, he helped oust a sitting commissioner to become an acting commissioner.  During the 1994 strike, he led the owners in the implementation of a salary cap.  When it came to helping owners and getting new ballparks, he got the approval from the owners to contract two major league franchises.  However, suddenly, with steroids, Selig was not only silent, he has also acted as someone who had little power to address the issue.

Fact is Selig didn’t address the issue because there were growing attendance and revenues stemming from the Steroids Era.  It helped heal some of the wounds of the strike, and it led to larger and larger television contracts.  At best, Selig turned a blind eye to steroids use because it was helping the game.  At worst, he was a willing participant who cared not for the sanctity of baseball’s sacred records.

Whatever you believe, the Steroids Era is an indelible part of his history.  And yet, with his induction into the Hall of Fame, he now appears to be the only person untainted by the era.

Yes, it is a different panel of voters that voted for Selig than had the opportunity to vote for players like Barry Bonds and Roger Clemens.  However, it should be noted that this same panel had the opportunity to elect McGwire into the Hall of Fame as the same time as Selig, and yet, McGwire fell far short of the votes needed for induction to the Hall of Fame.  This seems odd, especially when you consider the Mitchell Report, which was commissioned by Selig, found Selig partially culpable for the Steroids Era:

Everyone involved in baseball over the past two decades – Commissioners, club officials, the Players
Association, and players – shares to some extent in the responsibility for the steroids era. There
was a collective failure to recognize the problem as it emerged and to deal with it early on. As a
result, an environment developed in which illegal use became widespread.

Mitchell Report, p. SR-36.

Despite the Mitchell Report, the Hall of Fame has decided to take two very separate and distinct stances on McGwire.  With respect to the steroids usage, the Hall of Fame is now asserting that any player who benefited from the use of steroids should be barred from the Hall of Fame.  However, any executive or owner who not only shared the benefits of McGwire’s steroids use, but also helped promote a culture of steroids use across baseball could reap the benefits thereof.  Overall, the Hall of Fame has decided that Selig can benefit from the wrong actions of players he did little to nothing to stop.  It is really difficult to make sense of two very different positions.

Selig’s Legacy

No matter how you look at it, Selig’s enduring legacy is going to be: (1) he was the commissioner who cancelled a World Series; (2) he was the commissioner that presided over the Steroids Era; and (3) he is the commissioner that introduce Interleague Play and the Wild Card.

As seen above, Selig’s is a complicated legacy, and that is before you get into relatively minor decisions like not letting the New York Mets wear the first responder’s caps on 9/11 to honor those people who died during the most devastating terror attack on U.S. soil, forcing the McCourts to sell the Los Angeles Dodgers, or his empowering the Wilpons to continue ownership of the Mets despite their financial difficulties resulting from the Madoff Scandal.

Maybe it is too soon to judge Selig’s overall legacy.  On the positive, he has grown the sport financially, and he has introduced some aspects to the game that are currently seen as positives.  No one should overlook those accomplishments.

However, Selig was an owner who helped build distrust between the owners and players than helped create the 1994 strike and the cancellation of the World Series.  His actions and inactions as commissioner caused him to be called before a Congress who continuously threatened to revoke baseball’s antitrust exemption.  Selig presided over the end of baseball in Montreal, and he also has helped put the Athletics in limbo.  He has twice been a part of the sport being embarrassed with the owners twice being found to have committed unfair labor practices.  The actions cost the owners nearly $300 million not including whatever revenues were lost during the 1994 season.

Overall, it is fair to say Selig’s has damaged baseball as both an owner and a commissioner.  At a minimum, his negatives should have called for more time to judge his legacy.  Instead, we now have someone in the Hall of Fame who:

  • Helped collude to restrict player movement and salaries;
  • Helped facilitate the 1994 strike;
  • Cancelled the World Series;
  • Was part of a collection of owners twice found to have committed unfair labor practices;
  • Oversaw the end of baseball in Montreal; and
  • Was partially culpable for the Steroids Era.

It is hard to find a person in baseball who has had as negative an effect upon the game of baseball.  However, all of this was overlooked, and he was inducted into the Hall of Fame presumably because he made a lot of decision makers a lot of money.